

RELOCATING THE NEXUS OF CITIZENSHIP, HERITAGE AND TECHNOLOGY

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Abstract

In an era when citizenship no longer guarantees access to all of what were considered basic services, the emphasis on heritage to enhance social cohesion seems to have grown. Apart from reinforcing traditional heritage activities, the custodians of national culture are attempting to foster belonging through the digital dissemination of cultural artefacts. Ironically, the same market-driven neo-liberalism which favoured the dismantling of the welfare state seems to underlie the production of electronic culture. Moving the heritage-technology link from the context of commerce to that of citizenship allows for the consideration of broader societal interests. Such a process can lead to a renewed social contract between citizen and state that would reassert social rights as well as institute a cultural right to access essential communicative resources for citizenship. These rights would be reciprocated by responsibilities of citizens for the ethical and conscientious use of common resources for the public good.

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A number of governments have over the last decade vigorously espoused the cause of protecting national heritage.* This appears to be happening at the same time that the welfare state is being downsized. In an era when citizenship no longer guarantees the right to all of what were considered basic services, the emphasis on heritage as a means to enhance social cohesion seems to have grown.¹ Apart from reinforcing traditional heritage activities, the custodians of national culture are increasingly coming to view the digital dissemination of cultural artefacts as a way to foster belonging. Ironically, the same neo-liberal ideas which have favoured the dismantling of the welfare state seem to underlie the production, packaging and marketing of electronic culture. Once again, the interests of the marginalised tend to be disregarded. An emphasis on social and cultural rights and responsibilities may help to re-locate the nexus linking citizenship, heritage and technology, which lies mostly within the parameters of commerce, to a framework of broader societal interests.

Citizenship and the Welfare State

One of the major themes of post-cold war political and scholarly discourses has been the nature of civil society, a term that “usually refers to that set of social relations which enjoys relative autonomy from the state” (Splichal, Calabrese and Sparks 1994, 1). The relationship between state and civil society has largely been constructed in a dichotomous fashion even though the two entities overlap in several ways (Braman 1995, 7-8). The locus of the state in public life has been diminishing, not only in eastern Europe and developing countries where it has had the broadest presence, but also in the West. Most western countries have constitutions that provide for rights-based structures legitimising civil society’s active engagement with the state. Democratic processes that allow for genuine popular participation facilitate involvement between the two spheres, which, however, is resisted by incumbent political structures and state bureaucracies.²

Citizenship is a key notion linking civil society with the state: “it operates in the hinge that articulates civil society and the state in an open-ended and indeterminate relationship” (Mercer 1994, 284). At the basis of this relationship is the understanding that the state will safeguard the rights of citizens, who for their part will fulfil certain obligations to the former (Kaplan 1993, 247) — primarily to obey the law and remain loyal to the national community. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke’s writings presented this social contract as being the basis of democracy. Early liberal philosophy also gave rise to the notion of a welfare state that would maintain social peace by ensuring a minimal quality of life for citizens through government programs. Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu wrote in the eighteenth century, “The state owes every citizen an assured subsistence, proper nourishment, suitable clothing, and a mode of life not incompatible with health [...] whether it is to prevent the people from suffering, or whether it be to prevent them from revolting” (Morris 1966, 91).

This pragmatic-sounding proposal had been developed into full-blown state policies by the mid-twentieth century when the Beveridge Report to the British government laid out guiding principles for the administration of social security.

The State should offer security for service and contribution. The State in organizing security should not stifle incentive, opportunity, responsibility; in establishing a national minimum, it should leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to provide more than that minimum for himself and his family (Thomson 1966, 198).

These views were to be emulated in the (British) Commonwealth, the United States, and Europe. Social insurance was conceived as an attack on Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. The strategy was based on co-operation between the state and the citizen.

However, by the 1980s the welfare state had come under strong attack from Thatcherism and Reaganomics, which proposed that the common good could be best assured by furthering private interests. Neo-liberal ideas supporting massive reductions in the social infrastructure, on the one hand, and the liberalisation of trade policies, on the other, have had a huge impact on the contract between state and citizen. Not only have the obligations of the state to the citizen been attenuated, but so has the strength of the geographical borders which mark out the extent of the national community. Freer trade between countries as well as easier lateral communications between individuals across continents have reinforced extra-territorial communities of interest.

Heritage as an Agent for Social Cohesion

Since the state has over the last few centuries come increasingly to be identified with the nation, citizenship and civil society have also been generally conceptualised within a national framework. Prior to the emergence of postmodernist critiques, the notion of the nation had been frequently constructed as a monolingual, monocultural, and monoethnic entity. Adherence to the nation-state was thus based not only on the social contract but also on the belief of belonging to a community with shared socio-cultural characteristics.³ Emphasis on the ties that bind the national community has become all the more urgent as other means of social cohesion have become looser. Among the most consistent responses has been to stress national culture and heritage. The 1980s saw the popularising of national histories in a number of western countries (Furedi 1992).

The centrifugal movement of "globalisation" also appears to be inspiring a centripetal resurgence of national and communal identities.⁴ As the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty have created multi-state groupings in North America and Western Europe, several governments in these regions have simultaneously turned to protect their distinct national identities. Debate rages in the US Congress to declare English as the sole official language. The provincial government of Quebec frequently cites what it views as its status as the lone Francophone territory in an otherwise Anglophone North America to be the reason for its restrictions against the public use of languages other than French. France has also grown ever more protective of its language and culture, especially in the digital environment. The United Kingdom and Canada established Heritage departments in the early 1990s to consolidate the administration of their respective national cultures. Even as the European Union seeks to create a unified bloc of states, its programming stresses the retention of national and regional heritages, as does the Council of Europe. "Heritage tourism" is also emphasised in government policies.⁵

"Heritage" has become a popular term, often replacing "culture," "history" and "archaeology." A co-ordinating body for archaeological associations based in Milan is called the European Forum of Heritage Associations. What used to be called "natural history" is increasingly referred to as "natural heritage." The home page of the Natural Heritage Network Central Server on the World Wide Web tells us: "Natural heri-

tage programs exist throughout much of the Western Hemisphere. Collectively, they represent the largest ongoing effort to gather standardised data on endangered plants, animals and ecosystems."⁶ A new site of the Canadian Museum of Nature has been named the Natural Heritage Building. The decision in the US to fell a 2,000 year-old tree to restore an historic military ship was hailed by a federal senator as the noblest use to which it could be put. Natural heritage is thus placed in the service of national heritage. Such uses of "heritage" have strengthened its nuance as an inheritance that can be possessed and owned, and increasingly drawn into the sphere of property rights.⁷

Robert Hewison cites the British disdain for use of the word "culture" in describing their way of life as the reason why the Conservatives in 1992 chose "National Heritage" to be the name of the new government department bringing together responsibility for communications, the arts, museums, libraries, the built and landscaped environment, and sport.⁸ "It is not part of our culture [...] to think in terms of a cultural policy," he was told by a departmental official (Hewison 1996, 1). There has raged a vigorous debate in the UK about the state's ideological construction of national heritage. Hewison (1987) has led the critique that links the official discourse on heritage to national decline. His particular attack targets the commercialisation carried out by what he terms "the heritage industry." Wright (1992) has studied the broad popular appeal of heritage as a reaction to the uncertainties of postmodernity. In defence of official heritage practices, Samuel writes,

The new version of the national past [...] is inconceivably more democratic than earlier ones, offering more points of access to ordinary people, and a wider form of belonging. Indeed even in the case of the country house, a new attention is lavished on life below stairs (1994, 160).

However, Walsh (1992) contends that the commercial packaging of heritage appeals only to the elite classes and that the general profile of visitors to heritage sites has remained constant over the last three decades.

Current political interest in heritage is especially strong in conservative and right-wing circles (Gilroy 1992; Yuval-Davis 1986). In such contexts, nostalgia for the collective Self's own past sometimes turns into the desire to erase the Other's presence and heritage. Nationalist elements in North America, Europe, and Australasia seek to recreate previous periods of their history when peoples of non-European, non-Christian origins were absent in the symbolic constructions of the respective nation. The name of the Heritage Front, a North American neo-Nazi group, is an example.⁹ In a recent manifestation of extreme hatred for the Other, many people were massacred and centuries-old structures destroyed to "ethnically cleanse" certain regions of the former Yugoslavia. In northern India, some Hindu revivalists destroyed the Babri Mosque, one of the oldest monuments of Muslim presence, in order to reclaim what they believed to be the site of Lord Rama's birthplace. In these cases, the physical heritage of the Other has become a specific target for destruction as the Self seeks to reassert its own history.

A problem facing those western states strengthening heritage policies to reinforce social cohesion is the redefinition of citizenship in the light of substantial immigration from Asia, Africa and Latin America. The governments of Canada, the US, Australia, and New Zealand have also faced increasing demands for recognition from aboriginal groups. If the past is to be emphasised, where will the darker-skinned citizens fit

into older images of a linguistically, culturally, ethnically and religiously monolithic national community?¹⁰ Multiculturalism policies have provided some of the answers. Funding programs have made grants for the commemoration of the histories and cultures of minority groups, with particular emphasis on their contribution to the country of adoption (Karim 1996c). Yet the fundamental issue of blending a monocultural past with a multicultural present remains unresolved.¹¹

Heritage and Technology

Major museums, archives and art galleries have for generations effectively used the latest-available technologies for restoration, preservation, organisation, and display purposes; they are now increasingly turning to digital means to perform some of these functions. Use of what is popularly viewed as futuristic technology has become integral to the preservation of the past. The computerisation of heritage information by both the public and private sectors forms a substantial proportion of digitisation activities in North America, Europe and Australia (Karim 1996a; 1997). Varying industry practices such as Bill Gates' frenzied acquisition of digital rights to major art collections via his firm Corbis and the penchant of up and coming multimedia firms to locate in heritage buildings also seem to be part of this forward leap into the past. Other indications of the trend are the establishment of history television channels in US and Canada and the hurried scavenging of archival collections by the makers of retrospective fin de millennium television productions (Hazleton 1997).

While the bulk of heritage digitisation activities remain at the government level, they are increasingly being carried out in partnership with industry. This relationship is redefining the role of the state as a primary custodian of tax-supported cultural collections and is raising concerns about the growing control of commercial interests over the heritage sector. Those who make the decisions over the kinds of materials that should be computerised will determine which stories will be told and those that will remain absent in cyberspace.¹² The digitisation of museum and archival collections may at first glance seem to be an efficient means to make cultural materials more accessible; but excessive reliance on this technology may actually reduce the access that certain sections of society presently enjoy. Even in the United States and Canada, which have the highest per capita levels of ownership of information technology, less than 15 per cent of the households had access to the Internet in 1995 (Dickinson 1996). Yet, when the funding of the Art Gallery of Ontario was cut in October 1995, it scaled back on the outreach activities which are part of fulfilling its mandate "to all the people of Ontario" while simultaneously accelerating its digitisation activities in the assumption that "information pipelines in and out of the gallery will eventually connect millions of potential users" (Government Cutbacks 1995, A13). Developing countries stand to lose the most if their heritage is digitally mined without their participation: the electronic colonisation of the cultural resources of the South threatens to echo the earlier plundering of its natural wealth by the North (Braman 1997).

Governments in several industrialised countries have made policy decisions to convert the holdings of their heritage institutions into electronic formats. Large sums of money have been spent on this endeavour. The Library of Congress had a budget of one million dollars per annum for five years between 1990 and 1995 for its American Memory project, which digitised some 250,000 items. Materials were published on CD-ROM and video disk, and were distributed to educational institutions.¹³ The

European Union has declared the digitisation of cultural materials a priority for its information technology programs. France's ministry of Culture has embarked on a vigorous program of electronically converting its cultural holdings, making available a vast amount of information on the Minitel computer network and on other digital media. By 1994, the French government had spent or allocated 75 million francs to support heritage multimedia projects; another 100 million francs were set aside in 1996 to support the implementation of its cultural multimedia policy.

However, given the scale of the task, these resources are not adequate. Electronic conversion, be it text, sound, still image, film, or video, is an expensive proposition, and only a select number of heritage institutions have benefited from funding programs. In a period when governments are generally cutting back on cultural spending, many public museums have looked to industry to help digitise their collections. Even the financial support garnered by those museums, art galleries, archives, and libraries adept in marketing themselves does not cover all the costs. The Library of Congress' 1995-2000 digitisation project has had to seek 45 million of its 60 million dollar cost from the private sector. Donors have included some corporations with an obvious commercial interest in the project: Metromedia, Bell Atlantic, the Discovery Channel, and Eastman Kodak. In Europe, the information technology industry has worked with a number of museums and art galleries. For example, Microsoft, IBM, Kodak, Polaroid, Cognitive Applications, and France Telecom participated in digitising the holdings of London's National Gallery. The Canadian Museum of Civilisation has gone as far as to accommodate Digital Equipment Limited within its hallowed premises.

Several observers have commented on the entrenchment of the uni-dimensional conceptualization of information as a commodity.¹⁴ Dan Schiller notes that it is Not just any commodity, either, but a fundamental source of growth for the market system as a whole; information, some say, has become the essential site of capital accumulation within the world economy (1988, 27).

This development fundamentally affects the manner in which knowledge is treated: it is increasingly coming, especially in the context of the "information society," to be reduced to standardised packages for consumers. Perhaps the greatest effect of the commodification of information is on aspects of collective life considered to be beyond the range of quantification, namely culture and heritage. Art has long been commercialised; now, the packaging of cultural artefacts into electronic merchandise permits the marketing of masterpieces as file items in CD-ROMs and other digital formats. Compared to viewing the reproduction of art in illustrated books the experiential aspects of using digital means offers a qualitatively different level of interactivity, an experience which may be further enhanced through wider use of Virtual Reality and other immersive technologies. Whereas art prints and casts of well-known sculptures may have initiated the reduction of art to homogenous packages, the digital transformation of unique cultural artefacts into mass produced, commercially-organised units available at a price determined by the consumer market leads to the acceleration of this process.

The Antinomy of Cultural Protection and Global Trade

There appears to be emerging a fundamental contradiction in policies that seek to promote national heritage as a means to strengthen social cohesion and those that

foster the commercialisation of artefacts through digital means. As cultural information is drawn into a consumerist framework it will become increasingly inaccessible to significant sections of the national population. Access to the Internet is dependent heavily on factors such as household income, age, ability to use English, ethnicity, location, and institutional affiliation (Niece 1996). The very neo-liberal discourses which have argued for the reduction of the social benefits that the welfare state has provided to its citizens are also instrumental in determining how cultural information is disseminated in electronic forms. They have emphasised the identity of information users as consumers over that as citizens.

Additionally, the tension between the demands of global business and the development of national cultures is also rising with the increasing significance of free trade between states. The Canadian government attempted to deal with this situation by obtaining a cultural exemption in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In order to assist the country's magazine publishing industry in the face of competition from its powerful American counterpart, it imposed a 80 per cent tax on advertising in foreign magazines that publish in Canada without significant domestic editorial content. This measure was designed to stop Time Warner Incorporated which sought to sidestep Canadian protective measures at the border by beaming the content of its Sports Illustrated magazine electronically into Canada. The US government, acting on behalf of Time Warner, sidestepped NAFTA and obtained a ruling from a World Trade Organisation tribunal to support its view that the Canadian law was not in the interests of free trade (Palmer 1997). The Canadian government thus finds itself looking for other ways to shield the country's magazine publishing sector from an increasingly open world market.

There remains a primary divergence between the interests of freer world trade and the nurturing of national culture. In his study of Irish public broadcasting, Desmond Bell (1995, 72) outlines the antinomies of communication policy as being split by the axis of public service and the market: protectionism and cultural policy are in contention with free trade and competition policy. McGuigan sees a covert policy under Margaret Thatcher to draw public attention to national culture and social cohesion while pursuing free trade which actually undermined them.

[...] "heritage" retained a doctrinal connection to Disraelian "one-nation" Conservatism. Thatcher had it both ways, in effect, by pursuing the economic logic of international business and finance while paying lip service to the historical nation. For instance, backwoods Tories were allowed to insist upon the English literary canon and imperial history for the national curriculum while "the market" ran riot over the mass media. You do not need to be a conspiracy theorist to see how "heritage" may have served as a convenient albeit potent distraction from the more lucrative action in the cultural field (1997, 119).

However, as the tension between the forces of the global market and national cultural industries grows, national governments may increasingly review their free market policies.¹⁵ The role of digital technology in erasing the borders to facilitate commerce will probably become one of the major concerns of this review. How successful governments will be in maintaining sovereignty over their respective nations' cultural infrastructures in the face of a global free trade regime remains to be seen.

Towards Cultural Rights?

It is becoming increasingly clear that the commercialisation of heritage tends to work against the interests of national social cohesion. Since the heritage industry like any other industry works with the primary motive of making profits, it cannot be expected to support other than economic objectives. Governments cannot therefore hope to maintain the loyalty of citizens to the state by, on the one hand, reducing social benefits and, on the other, promoting national belonging via a heritage industry. The state also needs to recognise its fundamental obligation for the well being of all of its citizens. The social contract will have to be renewed in a manner that takes into account not only the changed technological environment but also the new composition of the national community.

In response to the political developments that have led to the attenuation of the welfare state there have been several proposals for the strengthening of the existing rights of citizens and the institution of cultural rights as a specific set of human rights. The Council of Europe has been at the forefront in promoting a right to participate in cultural life. Such a right is proposed as a fundamental human right for the creators and consumers of culture; culture is not to be used as an excuse to violate human rights and the cultures of minorities are to be protected (Fisher et al. 1994, 76-78). UNESCO's World Commission on Culture and Development has also supported the concept of cultural rights as human rights (UNESCO 1996).

Ilkka Heiskanen notes that journalistic freedom, intellectual property rights and the protection of privacy are the only cultural rights explicitly recognised in the international regimes controlling international communication. He complains that these regimes are "interested in enhancing freedom of expression only in technical terms of developing free and co-ordinated communication channels" (1995, 7). Graham Murdock and Peter Golding (1989), in their discussion of the link between information poverty and political inequality in the context of privatised communications, refer to T. H. Marshall's 1947 essay "Citizenship and Social Class." It distinguished three basic dimensions of citizenship and the rights related to them, namely civil, political, and social. Civil rights include the freedoms of speech, thought, religion, movement, association, and property ownership. Political rights delineate how citizens participate in elections, hold public office, and exercise political power.

According to Murdock and Golding, Marshall sees the third set of citizenship rights, social rights, as the distinctive product of the twentieth century. His presentation of them centres on the struggle to secure a basic standard of life and well-being for all through the institutionalisation of the welfare state. For our purposes, however, we need to add the rights of universal access to communications and information facilities, which emerged at the same time and were underwritten by public provision funded out of local and national taxes and institutionalised through the organisations responsible for continuing education, public libraries, and later, public broadcasting. Although Marshall does not stress the importance of communications rights, they are presupposed by his general definition of the social rights of citizenship, which cover "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society" (1989, 182).

Murdock and Golding go on to identify three kinds of relationship between communications and citizenship:

1. *access to information, advice, and analysis about rights;*
2. *access to information, interpretation, and debate to facilitate political choices, and to communication facilities to register criticism, mobilize opposition, and propose alternatives; and*
3. *access to a choice of representations offered within central communications sectors and the facility to contribute to developing those representations (183-84).*

They are suggesting the maximum possible range of diversity and participation at the production end, and the guarantee of universal access to services that enable the exercise of citizenship regardless of income or geography. However, Murdock and Golding state that the production and distribution system that is increasingly organised around market mechanisms cannot ensure what they view as these “essential communicative resources for citizenship” (184). They attempt to demonstrate in their study that “Whenever access to the communications and information resources required for full citizenship depends upon purchasing power [...], substantial inequalities are generated that undermine the nominal universality of citizenship.”

Conclusion

Murdock and Golding’s focus on rights disregards the other, complementary aspect of the social contract: citizens’ obligations to the larger community. Without subscribing to the communitarian critique of what Amitai Etzioni calls “the rights industry” (1996, 42), I support a reassertion of the dialectic between rights and responsibilities within a renewed social contract. The reinforcement of social rights/responsibilities and the institution of a cultural right/responsibility may be received favourably by those governments seeking to enhance national cohesion in the face of globalisation. This renewed social contract would not merely provide access to national heritage but empower citizens’ participation in society. It will also reflect not a monolithic vision of the one nation but the many nations in one. Universal access to information and communication technologies has to be assured; this will assist in providing the broadest-possible access to “essential communicative resources for citizenship.” “Heritage” would embrace Marshall’s broader notion of “social heritage” that includes economic welfare as well as access to cultural and communicative resources. The concomitant responsibility of citizens and groups of citizens would involve the ethical and conscientious use of the resources of the social heritage for public good.

The encounter of heritage and technology has hitherto largely taken place in the context of commerce. Relocating this relationship within the framework of citizenship allows for the possibility of shifting the electronic transmission of cultural information away from the predominantly economic interests. At the nexus of citizenship, heritage and technology lies an opportunity to revitalise the relationship between state and civil society. This relationship would be based on broader societal values which would ensure that economic contingencies are balanced by cultural and spiritual concerns. Such a dynamic would also allow for an international regime not dominated by global market imperatives but by respect for the rights of citizens.

Notes:

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1. According to a Canadian government discussion document, "social cohesion is derived from investments in human and social capital, which include not only social programs, but also traditions of civic engagement, such as voting, newspaper readership and membership in community associations" (Government of Canada 1996, 2).
- 2 "Citizen" in this article is not restricted to the legal definition of the term but includes other residents who participate in the collective life of the particular state.
3. Benedict Anderson's (1983) seminal work on the imagined nature of nations underlines the continual ideological labour that governments have to expend in assuring populations of the essential validity of the countries they govern. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) have discussed how traditions are invented and re-invented to legitimize incumbent power structures.
4. This is not to imply agreement with Benjamin R. Barber's thesis in *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1995), which constructs the assertion of sub-national identity and globalisation as completely polarised forces. See Karim (1996b).
5. A report on conserving heritage, published by the provincial government of Ontario, had the following to say by way of definition: "Consistent with international usage, people take heritage to be all that our society values and that survives as the living context – both natural and human – from which we derive sustenance, coherence, and meaning in our individual and collective lives" (Government of Ontario 1990, 1).
6. Nature Conservancy (<http://www.abi.org>).
7. In an interesting use of the term by the private sector, an advertisement placed in a newspaper by a Swedish car manufacturer stated: "Our heritage [sic] with aircraft led us to a very simple principle: There should be no forces outside your control" (Saab 1997, 31-32).
8. Before the broader inclusion under "heritage" in 1992, the term was largely limited to the built and landscaped structures. These were tended by the National Trust, a voluntary organization founded in 1895; the National Heritage Memorial Fund and English Heritage were established as public bodies in the 1980s "in order to save the aristocratic and aristocratically veneered past" (McGuigan 1992, 122). The new Labour government in the UK has re-named the National Heritage department as that for Culture, Media and Sport.
9. There have also emerged some interesting debates around the issue of heritage and racial exclusion in the US. The Stars and Bars symbol that appears on the Confederate flag, and which has come to symbolize Southern racism for many, is being presented by some South Carolina politicians as a signifier of "heritage not hate" (Hitt 1997).
10. The presence of non-white minorities has often been erased from the historical memory of nation-states. An example is the celebrated photograph commemorating the driving of "the Last Spike" into the trans-Canada railroad in 1885, which symbolized the joining of eastern and western ends of the country. The picture did not portray a single person of non-white origins despite the vital contribution of Chinese workers, many of whom had died building the railway on the treacherous mountain slopes in western Canada.
11. The dominant discourses about what constitutes national cultural priorities generally tend to exclude minorities. For example, while the Information Highway Advisory Council of Canada (1997) recommended that the government support the growth of French-language content of the new media, it made almost no mention of content catering to other cultural groups in what is an officially multicultural country (also see Karim 1993). On the other hand, the Canadian government has received favourable reviews for some of its educational "Terra Nova" CD-ROMs on the country's history, which have attempted to represent the views of various cultural groups (Lewington 1997, A7).
12. The president of Dialog, a major US database vendor, indicated that while the corporation was interested in acquiring electronic information from tax-supported public institutions, it was not interested in humanities databases which "are not going to earn their keep and pay back their development costs" (Schiller and Schiller 1988, 161).
13. The National Initiative for a Networked Cultural Heritage, a collaborative project of the American Council of Learned Societies, the Coalition for Networked Information and the Getty Art History Information Program, is lobbying the US government "to encourage the development of the National

Information Infrastructure as a means to preserve, access, and creatively build upon our cultural legacy, and we want to do so in a manner which embraces the fullest understanding of the nation's cultural heritage – the totality of human work, creative effort and thought manifest in the United States, today and in the past" (1994).

14. Cf. Babe 1996; Braman 1996; Meštrović 1994; Mosco and Wasko 1988.

15. Sylvia Ostry, Canada's chief negotiator at the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations, seemed to be having second thoughts about free trade when she said in June 1997, "There is a phenomenal, unrelenting pressure for a single global market. Do we want it and where will we draw the line between efficiency and sovereignty?" (Lindgren 1997, A1).

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