

SEVEN THESES ON RELIGION AND WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

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Colin Sparks read an earlier version of the text intended for presentation at the 7th Colloquium on Communication and Culture (Piran, April 7-10, 1994), and made several useful comments.

I have to apologize for focusing my contribution exclusively on the problem of religion and war in the former Yugoslavia in an international conference of wider scope on "Ethno-religious Nationalist Conflicts and Communication". However, I should like to emphasise that there is a particular value in exploring extreme cases and in using so-called "thinking in extremes". Such cases and such thinking offer an opportunity to disclose something structurally very important that may remain hidden in other cases.

I The first thesis is that the course of events in the former Yugoslavia since the mid-eighties, including the war now going on, may be considered as a stimulating case for a debate on some aspects of the ethno-religious nexus in the context of contemporary social divisions, social cleavages and social conflicts. It is also the most appropriate testing ground for detecting some consequences of a possible religious involvement in a hot war on European soil. In other words, the starting assertion is, that the course of recent events in the former Yugoslavia has a very important symptomatic charge for an exploration of the central problems of this conference.

It is, of course, possible to dismiss in advance such a thesis on three major counts. First, by insisting that the war in the former Yugoslavia has been a totally anomalous contemporary phenomenon with no symptomatic value at all. Second, by underlining, that it is essentially outside of the mainstream of modern European political history due to the peculiar nature of the war being fought in the former Yugoslavia, and by the type of political ideologies used to motivate and legitimize it. Consequently, it is to be taken as a temporary phenomenon of purely marginal relevance. Third, by maintaining that it is a temporary phenomenon, resulting exclusively from a very peculiar convergence of essentially contingent Balkan historical and social circumstances, and not something with any paradigmatic relevance.

However, it should be remembered, firstly, that, as B. Barber has underlined, there have been more than thirty wars waged recently round the world, mostly of a tribal, racial, ethnic and/or religious type (Barber 1992, 843). Secondly, it may be plausibly maintained that the course of recent events, exploding in a war in

the former Yugoslavia, is hard to interpret as a total historical novelty on European continent in the current century. Therefore, it is no wonder that there have been so many developments in the former Yugoslavia in the late eighties and early nineties bearing the visible signs of something *deja vue* in modern European political history, as well as in the modern history of the region. These range from massacres of civilians on ethnic and religious grounds, ethnic cleansing, forced expulsions, so-called "humane" exchange of populations, exclusions from citizenship on mass scale etc., to a total war. One should remember that, as Anthony Giddens has written, "the twentieth century world has been a bloody and frightening one" (Giddens 1992, 3), and that the invention of total war has been an European one as "the generalization of war to the whole of populations." Total wars are deliberately conducted not purely against the hostile armed forces but with the deliberate aim to break down and to obtain the total submission of the respective enemy population in general (Giddens 1992, 330). Therefore, it is not a radical novelty, characteristic of the former Yugoslavia, to find current ideologies, such as the interpretation of national history as a kind of martyrology (in Serbian usage) or Calvary (in the Croatian one) to be now recompensed, or to run into some kind of fascination with death as a sanctified sacrifice.¹ One can read, for instance, in a book published recently by the Serbian Ministry for Information, the following lines: "The Celestial Kingdom has been a historic and spiritual message that people, forced to choose between unfreedom and death, accept death as a regulative idea"² and so on. Moreover, in the final analysis, the political strategy expressed by the famous formula "Every nation, one state, the entire nation in one state", dominant today in the former Yugoslavia, has been a Western European one, too. It seems, therefore, that there are good reasons to conclude that the recent events in the former Yugoslavia have been more in accordance with the mainstream of modern European political history. It is perhaps some kind of delay that these event stand outside the mainstream of that history. Thirdly, there are at least some indications that the course of recent events in the former Yugoslavia may be taken primarily as the extreme case of some contemporary trends of wider relevance. They disclose in a brutal way what in other contemporary situations remains present but latent. To substantiate this point one may quote some contemporary authors and their diagnoses of trends persisting in a wider social context today. The first one is certainly P. Glynn, writing recently about the advent of an age of Balkanization, that "on every continent, in almost every major nation, and in almost every walk of life, the overriding political reality is that of increasing social separatism and fragmentation – a sometimes violent splintering of humanity by ethnic group, race, religion, and even (to a less dramatic extent) such characteristics as gender or sexual orientation" (Glynn 1993, 21). The second one is N. Kokosalakis who writes that "as the world becomes increasingly interdependent, and as the utopianism of modernity becomes explicit, ethnic struggles and the assertion of identities become a prominent feature of the contemporary world" (Kokosalakis 1993, 94). In this sense, the peculiarity of former Yugoslavia may be in substance reduced to the fact that, as O. Kallscheuer (1993, 8) writes, it has been the European region where, more than anywhere else, religious memoirs and identities have become lately motives for bloody self-affirmation. The third is G. E. Rusconi, who, asking himself whether Italy will remain a nation, has come to conclusion, that even "a nation can cease to exist" too, and that under certain circumstances the desire to search for or to "invent ethnic roots" more fundamental than the historic nation may emerge (Rusconi 1993, 309).

The second thesis is that the course of events in the former Yugoslavia since the mid-eighties has not been purely accidental and totally unexpected. The cruel and protracted war, which exploded in 1991, did not just fall from the skies, without anybody knowing why and how. It was easily foreseen and it was an almost necessary consequence of a logic built into otherwise seemingly randomly connected events since the beginning of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Consequently, the role of religion in the course of events in the former Yugoslavia has to be projected on the background of that logic.

Such an assertion may be challenged on two major counts. First, that it is in substance wrong to consider religion as a war-generating factor, since it has allegedly been shown to be a peace-producing and unifying one. Second, there is no convincing reason to assume that the war in the former Yugoslavia has been a religious war, or that the religious factor has been the crucial one in it.

Certainly, one may reasonably challenge any a priori assertion about the inherent war-generating quality of religion as such, but at the same time one should be very sceptical about the opposite: the a priori claim that religion has always been a peace- and harmony-generating factor. There is at least some truth in the assertion that "thirty centuries of history have demonstrated the reality of wars of religion. Today it is the declarations of Ayatollah Khomeini which have alerted the attention of the general public to the persistence of such a phenomenon, but there is also Ireland, first a war for independence as well as in a war of religion, there is Israel, Lebanon where the war rumbles on in the name of a God unique, there is Iraq which in spite of the secular character of its regime does not hesitate to make an appeal to the jihad" (Torrelli 1992, 9).

Therefore, it is legitimate to raise the question of the role of religion in social conflicts including wars, and also the question as to "whether three religions (all monotheistic) have been or are still in the same degree vectors of the war" (Torrelli 1992, 11). Furthermore, it may be conceded that the war in the former Yugoslavia has not been a classical religious war, interpreted in terms of a holy war (see Touscoz 1992, 93). However, the question of the possible role of religion in that war cannot be reduced simply to the question of whether or not it is essentially a holy war. Consequently, insisting that the war in the former Yugoslavia has not been a classical religious war or holy war does not make superfluous discussion of the possible role of religion in the actual war. Neither does it exclude in advance any important involvement of religion in that war in the same way as, for instance, the involvement of religion in the never ending war in North Ireland, or the seventeen year long war in the Lebanon, or in the never ending multifaced war in Palestine.

It seems very plausible to argue that a war generally does not have to be a holy war to be a religious one for it to be a war with some kind of religious involvement. It can be:

(a) a war with some explicit, religiously defined goals, included into the set of declared major war objectives, which are prevalently of non-religious nature;

(b) a war generated by a strategy of a purely political type, obtaining unconditional legitimacy in explicit religious terms. It may be explicitly legitimized by the respective ecclesiastical organizations, acting as legitimating systemic political institutions of the first order;

(c) a war having obtained a partial religious legitimation at the level of political strategy, but not the same legitimacy at the level of political tactics or moves;

(d) a war waged purely as a political war with no religious war aims at all, but obtaining additional religious legitimacy as 'a just war', due to the concrete circumstances of the way it broke out and is being conducted;

(e) a war referring to transcendence, defined in a nonconfessional way, because "any transcendence may be captured to serve national or social causes", and such a capture "may feed the legitimacy of an international as well as civil war" (Torrelli 1992, 11);

(f) a war of purely secular faiths, in terms of a conflict of believers against believers (*croire contre croire*, in P. Michel's terms; Michel 1993), opposing one world order with another, one absolute truth to another absolute truth (Torrelli 1992, 26);

(g) a war with religion involved in it negatively, by contesting and delegitimizing it explicitly in strictly religious terms;

(h) a war, having visible and important religious consequences, direct as well as indirect ones, welcome or not, expected or unexpected etc.

It is evident that the role of religion in the former Yugoslavia may be plausibly classified under all of the headings in this classification, except (g).

Furthermore, it ought to be added that the analysis of the role of religion in the war in the former Yugoslavia should not be reduced only to its involvement in the actual war since its beginning. It ought to be enlarged to include role of religion in the preceding exacerbation of social divisions and cleavages, as well as in the previous intensification of social conflicts to the state of extreme incandescence, in an area considered as the optimal testing ground for ecumenism and pluriconfessional coexistence and cohabitation.

Finally, there are at least three relevant empirical facts that should be noted preceding any sophisticated analysis. First, it is a hard fact that it is mostly the believers and the members of different confessions who have been killing one another, who have been destroying other people's homes and churches etc. Second, there is no doubt that religious symbolism has been widely used by the opposing sides in recent political conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, including the armed ones. It has been used either in a positive sense, for self-identification, or in negative one for the identification of enemies. Third, there is no doubt that the war has had so far some very important consequences for religions existing in the former Yugoslavia. For instance, (a) by changing the religious map of the area in an important way, (b) by changing the actual position of different religions within different institutional frameworks from extra-systemic or anti-systemic to intra-systemic or supra-systemic, (c) by altering in an important manner previous relations among existing religions from dialogue to confrontation, (d) by important transformations in the content of the religions in the area, especially altering the balance between universalism and particularism in different religious cultures by emphasizing the particularist moments, (e) by important changes in the external environment of religious activity, primarily in the degree of freedom for activities of particular religious organizations in some parts of the country.

III. The third thesis is that the war in the former Yugoslavia did not explode as a necessary consequence of an otherwise totally spontaneous process of exacerbation of existing social divisions and cleavages, but as an easily anticipated consequence of deliberately chosen and elaborated political strategies. In substance, it is a war that broke out almost as a necessary result of political strategies, deliberately elaborated and chosen. These became dominant in the mid-eighties and have been moving along collision courses, leading to frontal confrontations, and from clash to clash. From the beginning they implied the recourse to organized political violence on mass scale and a systematic resort to arms. The crucial fact is that dominant political strategies have been inspired either by the famous formu-

la of Mazzini: "One nation one state, and only one state for every nation" or by the famous principle, described in 19th century German political thought as the principle of nationality (*Nationalitätsprinzip*), which proclaims "Every nation one state. The entire nation in one state." These slogans have been applied in a territory with mixed populations. The respective political strategies have been in substance nationalist, if nationalism is defined as a political principle requesting that the State and nation should be congruent (Hoogh 1992, 21), and if nationalism means that all social problems ought to be subordinated to the notion of nationhood (Markus 1993, 332). In substance, the dominant nationalist imperative, in E. Gellner's terminology, which demands congruence between the state and nation and the creation of some kind of political roof above a culture in a plurinational region (Gellner 1986, 96), paved the road for solving national problems by recourse to organized political violence on a mass scale and by resort to arms. Ultimately it led to a cruel and prolonged war. In the final analysis the war in the former Yugoslavia has fully confirmed von Clausewitz's thesis that war is nothing else but a continuation of politics by other means. It would probably confirm a rephrased version, maintaining that future politics, when peace is finally established in the area, will be in substance the continuation of the war by other means and methods. At the same time it has corroborated Hobsbawm's conclusion that a territorially homogenous nation should be considered a political programme usually realized by barbarians, or at least by the use of barbaric means and methods (Hobsbawm 1992, 147).

IV. The fourth thesis is that the opposed nationalist political strategies have obtained explicit religious legitimacy since beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, with the initial exception of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In substance, there has been a profound compatibility both between the political formula "One nation one state" and the older religiously coloured formula "One God, One Land and One Nation" and with the traditional view of religion as being an essential component of the respective national identities, a crucial component of the national state and a crucial mark of distinction from the others. This has come about in the context of a trend, described by R. Robertson as a trend of world dimensions, of the "politicization of religion" and "religionization of politics" (Robertson 1989, 13). The later legitimating references from all sides to the doctrine of a just war should not obscure this fact.

The politicization of religion has been going on along the lines of official politics, even if there is occasionally some critical rethinking, partial dissent and explicit distancing. It may be detected primarily in the political instrumentalization of religion, as well as in a religious instrumentalization of politics in almost every corner of the former Yugoslavia. In the first case, there is a visible process of the mobilization of all the resources available, including the religious ones, for political purposes in a situation of increasing social conflict. In the second case, there has been no realistic likelihood of a religious *riconquista* of a secularized society, and of a radical elimination of the atheistic ancient regime, without a religious intervention in politics. It seems that under such circumstances there is no better political and ideological shock therapy for turning a secular society into a confessional one than by stimulating a high tide of nationalism even with high probability of it leading to a war.

The parallel process of religionization of politics may be identified primarily in a strong inclination to present crucial political ideas and crucial political subjects as deserving total and unconditional adherence, an essentially non-negotiable support, and an overheated veneration, which is in substance religious or parareligious.

The most important aspects of this process have been the following:

(a) A systematic and lasting inclination to give religious attributes and connotations to key ideas in everyday political usage, even if they are of mundane origin. The visible intention is to increase their non-negotiable attraction and to intensify their emotional charge, as well as to protect them, by explicit sacralization, from any possible political criticism and immunize them from public dissent. They have thus been given an ultimate political legitimacy of an essentially numinous nature. Examples are the current political discourse about "sacred Croatia", "sacred Serbia", "celestial Serbia", "eternal Croatia", "the sacred territory of the fatherland", "the sacred and untouchable frontiers", "the sacred will of the people", the "sacred history of the fatherland" and so on;

(b) The existing social, political and cultural differences are projected on to an overstanding and overarching horizon of a metaphysical nature. This transforms primarily political conflicts into conflicts *quasi sub specie aeternitatis*, or aspects of the so-called "Grand History". It describes them ultimately as conflicts between different and opposed human types, between irreconcilable types of culture, between antagonistic types of civilization, between essentially opposed worlds as such etc. This reduces the possibility of their normal and peaceful coexistence and elevates the acceptable price to be paid for conflicts and war;

(c) A pervading and systematic manicheism, applied to the current conflicts, portrays the opposed parties, on the one side, as the angelic or quasi angelic personification of the Good as such and, on the other side, as the diabolic or quasi diabolic incarnation of the Evil as such. One side is depicted as God's side and the other stigmatized as Satan's side;

(d) A visible and almost official usage of the current interpretations of national history, on the one side, in terms of a genuine and sacred martyrology (in Serbian Orthodoxy) or a Calvary (in Croatian Catholicism) or a holocaust (in Bosnian Islam). These are presented as glorious in proportion to the quality and quantity of sufferings and victims that have to be recompensed or revenged. The respective nations are seen in terms of a privileged historic mission, which is quasi salvational in accordance with the eternal plans of Providence, or in terms of a national historic dedication, chosen in advance and non-negotiable, in which all are turned to Heaven and committed to the celestial cause and spiritual values;

(e) An eternalization of the nations involved in terms of an *Urvoik*, and in terms of their fundamental, allegedly suprahistoric and immutable qualities;

(f) An almost permanent resort to a theory of diabolic conspiracy (allegations range from a Masonic one through a Comintern one to a Vatican one respectively) against this or that nation in official interpretations of recent, crucial political events.

The final results of such a religionization of politics may be plausibly described as a kind of absolutization of some, otherwise controversial, political goals as well as their convincing sacralization. Using P. Michel's terminology we may see this as the deliberate reintroduction of politics with ultimate references and re-enchantments (Michel 1993, 230).

It is most important to emphasize some of the consequences. It is evident that it has been confirmed that the war, as well as all organized violence on mass scale with widespread mobilization of resources and with enormous sacrifices, needs some superior reference points, preferably of a transcendent type and referring to some supreme order different from the material, utilitarian and everyday. Furthermore, there is no wonder that the war in the former Yugoslavia has obtained traits similar to a holy war or jihad. For instance it has been very close to "a new war between 'be-

